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In this study, I examine the factors that influence school districts’ commitment to 
implement ESL (English as a Second Language) education in compliance with the federal 
Bilingual Education Act of 1968. To explain variation in implementation effort, I focus 
on several features of the local implementation environment, including the role of Latino 
descriptive representation. Utilizing data on all public school districts in Texas, I employ 
a Heckman two-stage estimation procedure that accounts for factors that influence school 
districts’ decisions to implement bilingual education programs as well as factors that 
affect the amount of resources school districts are willing to allocate towards bilingual 
education. The results indicate that Latino school board and teacher representation play a 
positive and statistically significant role in determining: 1) whether school districts 
implement bilingual education programs; and 2) the level of expenditures and teacher 
positions allocated towards bilingual education. Thus, policy implementation outcomes 
translate into substantive representation. 
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Chapter One – Review of Literature 
Introduction: Developments in Bilingual Education 
The most common Latino educational accommodation policy is bilingual or ESL

 
(English as a Second Language) education. Systematic implementation of bilingual 
education programs did not appear until federally mandated programs were formulated in 
the late 1960s. The Bilingual Education Act of 1968—an amendment to the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act—made bilingualism a national education policy that 
specifically mandates that all individual schools with twenty or more language-minority 
students in any one grade level must provide bilingual education classes. While federal 
law specifically mandates the general parameters for bilingual education policy, actual 
policy formulation and implementation devolves down a structural hierarchy.  
Aside from specifying federal mandates via the 1968 act, state and local bilingual 
education policy is essentially free from formal federal influence. The Supreme Court, in 
Lau v. Nichols (1974), ruled that schools’ failure to provide specialized instruction for 
ESL students constitutes a federal civil rights violation (Beck and Allexsaht-Snider 
2002). However, local school districts often do not implement enforcement procedures in 
compliance with federal law. According to the Georgia State Department of Education, 
for example, 32 Georgia school districts were noncompliant with the 1968 Act in 1998 
(Cumming 1999). Unless the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights (OCR) 
initiates a compliance review, or unless a parent initiates a lawsuit to address 
noncompliant ESL education procedures, state-level and local school administrations 
                                                        
 The terms bilingual and ESL will be used interchangeably to refer to this specific educational 
policy and in classifying linguistic minority students.  
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have the discretion to disregard federal civil rights law (Beck and Allexsaht-Snider 
2002).

 
In theory, federal education policies state the general policy parameters, the 
individual American states enumerate further specialized parameters, and local school 
boards eventually implement programs that are deemed necessary. We cannot categorize 
minority language education policy formulation and implementation as occurring in 
clearly delineated hierarchical tiers (i.e., ―made at only one level‖ and implemented at 
another) (Hamann 2002, 70). Political posturing, advocacy, and strategic maneuvering 
interact and vary across policy domains. Whereas state-level superintendents may hold 
substantial influence over minority language education policy in one state, local-level 
school superintendents—or local level curriculum coordinators—may wield considerable 
influence in another state. This is fairly common across a wide range of policy 
implementation arenas. Moreover, some education policy domains may incorporate 
policy arenas where teachers, parents, and individual students can voice their input. The 
extant research has attempted to assess patterns in bilingual education formulation and 
implementation.  
Bilingual Education Policy Implementation: Policy Actors 
Bilingual Education Implementation as a Representation Issue 
 I examine bilingual education implementation under the framework of descriptive 
representation. Given that local-level bureaucratic authorities are granted a considerable 
amount of discretion in determining whether to implement ESL education, as well as the 
                                                        
 And lower-tier curriculum coordinators often are reluctant to report noncompliant educational 
practices they may observe in schools due to concerns over losing their jobs via state-level 
defunding (Beck and Allexsaht-Snider 2002).  
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level of resources allocated toward ESL education, I focus on local-level policy actors as 
potential agents of representation. Descriptive representation, or ―the circumstances in 
which a citizen shares ascriptive characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender, and so 
forth with his [or her] representative,‖ has been examined in the literature on minority 
politics (Pantoja and Segura 2003, 443). Many studies of Latino descriptive 
representation take a political empowerment approach in examining the effects of Latino 
descriptive representation in state assemblies, state senates, and/or the U.S. House of 
Representatives (see Pantoja and Segura 2003). These studies typically contend that 
minority political empowerment, as a result of descriptive representation, may lead to 
decreased levels of political alienation and increased levels political efficacy and political 
trust, which may yield increased minority political participation.  
A much larger literature has attempted to shed light on how descriptive 
representation may lead to substantive representation, where ―the pursuit of policies or 
goals that benefit the particular group‖ being descriptively represented occurs (Berman 
and Salant 1998). The primary challenge in this literature lies in conceptualizing minority 
group interests, ―and the impact of political decisions on minority interests‖ (Robinson 
2002, 53). Minority groups and Latino groups specifically, are not structurally monolithic 
and undifferentiated. Language, as a cultural identity marker, serves as a primary 
indicator of Latino acculturation—with increased English-speaking capabilities typically 
indicating higher levels of acculturation. Linguistic minority children enter the socio-
political arena with a linguistic barrier that can arguably lead to future structural 
disadvantages. Therefore, descriptive representation at the school board level may be 
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especially important when the substantive goal entails overcoming linguistic barriers, and 
when the quality of education for linguistic minority students may be at stake.  
Dovi (2002) contends that descriptive representatives who ―possess strong mutual 
relationships with dispossessed subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups‖ are most 
likely to serve as effective minority group representatives. Descriptive representation 
arguably facilitates substantive representation for members of minority groups. 
Substantive representation occurs when policies or other governmental action is advanced 
in order to promote a given minority group’s political interests. Minority representatives 
at times have been deemed ardent advocates on issues and policies that are meant to 
target minority groups in beneficial ways. The literature has established clear linkages 
between descriptive representation and substantive representation at the local 
governmental level, among elected officials on city councils and school boards (see Dye 
and Renick 1981; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Campbell and Feagin 1975; Marschall 2005; 
Meier and England 1984; Eisinger 1982; Polinard, Wrinkle, Longoria, and Binder 1994; 
Robinson and England 1981). For instance, some have found that when minority groups 
are descriptively represented on school boards, issues on local school quality are raised in 
favor of minority students (Marschall 2005; Tate 2003). However, a necessary caveat 
should be made when making assumptions about descriptive representation. Descriptive 
representation does not necessarily constitute substantive representation. In fact, some 
would argue that descriptive representatives in educational administrative posts 
   5 
occasionally are strategically appointed to present an image of representation rather than 
substance of representation

 (Galindo 1997).  
Given that local-level authorities have considerable amounts of implementation 
discretion at their disposal, they arguably have the ability to influence bilingual education 
implementation and resource allocations. Are descriptive representatives at the school 
district level substantively representing linguistic minority students? High levels of 
bureaucratic discretion in this policy arena may provide the opportunity to find empirical 
evidence that local education bureaucrats are motivated to serve as advocates for the 
linguistic minority subset of the student population. The evidence from studies of 
whether descriptive representation leads to substantive representation has been mixed; 
most studies conclude that, ―Descriptive representation may lead to substantive 
representation sometimes, but the relationship is complex and uncertain‖ (Robinson 
2002, 54). By focusing at the policy implementation level, this study may contribute a 
more nuanced understanding of descriptive representation as it relates to substantive 
representation. That is, by modeling bilingual education policy implementation as a 
political outcome in assessing whether descriptive representation leads to substantive 
representation, this study moves beyond notions of ―passive‖ representation and focuses 
on the possibilities for ―active‖ representation (Meier and O’Toole 2006).  
                                                        
 For example, the aforementioned anti-bilingual education Schrenko-led Georgia Department of 
Education hired a Cuban American educational statistician as Title I director and supervisor for 
ESOL and Migrant Education Programs in 1997 (Beck and Allexsaht-Snider 2002). This political 
appointee proceeded to publicly state that, ―It was the patriotic duty of ESOL administrators and 
teachers to turn over any suspected illegal alien students to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service‖ (Beck and Allexsaht-Snider 2002, 48). The Supreme Court’s Plyer v. Doe (1982) ruling 
would deem any such actions by administrators or teachers unconstitutional, as ―policies that 
have a chilling effect upon the enrollment of Hispanic migrants or undocumented alien children‖ 
(Beck and Allexsaht-Snider 2002, 49).  
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Descriptive Representation: The Theory of Representative Bureaucracy 
Theories of representative bureaucracy generally are applied to analyses of 
outcomes of the policy process. Scholars of representative bureaucracy contend that 
federal and/or state policies are generally viewed as impediments to the local governance 
process (Meier and O’Toole 2006). Consistent with Meier and O’Toole (2006), and given 
the discretionary nature of bilingual education implementation policies, this paper adopts 
a ―bottom-up‖ approach to policy implementation. According to this approach, local 
bureaucrats serve critical roles in representing the interests of local citizens. Moreover, 
―Bureaucrats are not drags on responsiveness, as the top-down model might suggest, but 
rather essential links in translating preferences into policy as implemented‖ (Berkman 
and Plutzer 2010, 9).  
On the one hand, bureaucratic decisions may be constrained by institutional rules 
and arrangements and/or available resources. In the context of this paper, for example, 
rules mandating the implementation bilingual education fall directly under the auspices of 
the 1968 Bilingual Education Act. However, policy implementation may also reflect 
bureaucrats’ ideological predispositions and political preferences. Where policy 
implementers are permitted to act under bureaucratic arrangements that involve 
considerable amounts of local implementation discretion, policy implementation is quite 
often political. 
The policy-making literature frequently demonstrates that local-level bureaucrats 
and bureaucratic administrators

 exercise discretion (Rourke 1984), and ―because 
                                                        
 In the context of this paper, ―bureaucratic administrators‖ include school board 
members and school district administrators involved in the policy implementation 
process. The literature in representative bureaucracy includes school board members and 
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bureaucratic discretion exists, the representativeness of the bureaucracy becomes an 
important political question‖ (Mosher 1968, 103). The education policy arena involves a 
unique level of administrative discretion because school board positions are rarely full-
time positions; therefore, bureaucratic discretion is perhaps more influential in 
comparison to discretion in other bureaucracies (Tucker and Zeigler 1980; Meier and 
Stewart 1991). Consequently, I expect descriptive bureaucratic representation will be a 
major indicator of the types of education policies that will be yielded, as directly 
influenced by bureaucratic discretion. While much of the existing literature on 
representative bureaucracy focuses on African Americans (see Eisinger 1982), few have 
attempted to examine representative bureaucracy as it relates to Latinos.  
Meier and Stewart (1991), in examining behavioral characteristics of Latino 
school board members in the educational system, note that administrative discretion plays 
a role in determining whether representative bureaucrats influence education policy. 
Given the underlying assumption that Latino administrators ―should be more sensitive to 
the cultural norms and mores in the Hispanic community…[and] likely to become leaders 
in the Hispanic community‖ (Meier and Stewart 1991, 11), Latino administrators 
generally are assumed to be more likely to make educational policy decisions that are 
perceived as beneficial to Latino students.  
Furthermore, some have found evidence that indicates Latino administrators serve 
a meaningful role in assuring that Latino descriptive representatives are present in 
multiple levels of the policy implementation process. Descriptive bureaucratic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
school district administrators in this larger category, but I note a distinction between 
school board members as elected officials and school district administrators as non-
elected officials. Teachers are included in the local bureaucracy, but are treated as a 
separate category of non-elected officials.  
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representation is a multi-tiered phenomenon at the school district level. Districts with a 
higher percentage of Latino school board members generally employ a larger percentage 
of Latino school administrators (Meier and Stewart 1991). Subsequently, administrators 
(especially in larger school districts) have the discretion to hire teachers, and Latino 
administrators are more likely to hire Latino teachers (Meier and Stewart 1991). 
Shockley (1974) conducted a Latino education policy case study of Crystal City, Texas 
following an election that resulted in Latino majorities on the school board and city 
council. His analysis revealed that following the election, not only were more Latino 
school administrators and teachers hired, but also a variety of ―bilingual-bicultural‖ 
education policies were implemented (Shockley 1974).     
Teachers as Representative Bureaucrats 
 Teachers serve as the ―street level bureaucrats‖ in the education policy 
bureaucracy. It assumes that teachers are ―the equivalent of implementation bureaucrats 
in a school system, [and] use discretion when they apply guidelines issued by 
administrators or policies passed by the school board. Someone must decide if a 
particular policy is applicable in a given situation, and that person is usually a teacher 
[sic]‖ (Meier and Stewart 1991, 108). I expect that Latino teachers may be more receptive 
to potential language needs among the Latino student population, as these teachers may 
be more adept at identifying the need for a bilingual education program in compliance 
with the 1968 law. 
Heller, Holtzman, and Messick (1982) found that teachers frequently serve as the 
descriptive representatives most likely to influence policies regarding access to bilingual 
education. Correspondingly, Meier, Stewart, and England (1989) found that African-
   9 
American descriptive teacher representation served as the most substantively influential 
factor in reducing discrimination against African-American students. Laosa (1977) 
contends that teacher discrimination is based as much—if not more—on language as on 
ethnicity. In addition to being more likely to recognize potential differences in Latino 
students’ cognitive learning skills, Latino teachers generally are more likely to advocate 
education that is aimed toward accommodating ESL students’ language needs (Ramirez 
and Castaneda 1974). Moreover, Latino teachers arguably are more likely to recognize 
language difficulties as an education issue that should be addressed, rather than 
characterize language-minority students as ―unable to learn‖ (Fernandez and Guskin 
1981). These teachers arguably possess a systematic cultural sensitivity towards the 
linguistic minority student population. Latino teachers are more likely to have 
experienced socialization experiences that mirror the social origins of ESL students and, 
thus, may raise awareness of classroom issues that may necessitate education policy 
reform. 
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Chapter Two – Toward a Systematic Model of Bilingual Education Policy Implementation 
Minimal research has focused on the effects of minority representation on policy 
implementation outcomes. The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 constitutes introduced 
institutional rules regarding education for linguistic minority students. Where ESL 
education programs previously did not exist, school districts that fell under the auspices 
of the legislation were legally required to implement education reform. The law arguably 
introduced an institutional mechanism for protecting linguistic minority students’ 
interests (Robinson 2002). With this mechanism in place, descriptive representatives 
arguably could wield the power and authority ―to implement public policy in a manner 
consistent with their ideology and priorities‖ (Berkman and Plutzer 2010, 6). Ultimately, 
my ultimate goals in this research include: 1) assessing whether favorable institutional 
rules and arrangements motivate descriptive representatives to act on behalf of a minority 
group; 2) developing a nuanced understanding of descriptive representation as it relates to 
substantive representation in a policy arena; and 3) introducing an improved empirical 
modeling technique that recognizes the two-stage nature of a policy implementation 
process. 
Research Design 
Existing studies of bilingual education policies typically employ case study 
methods (see Baquedano-Lopez 2004; Gibson 1976; Havighurst 1976; Serrano 1974; 
Torres-Trueba 1976). Most studies are limited to one state or one school district (see 
Beck et al. 2002; Villenas 2002). Some have found patterns of interplay between 
―official‖ and ―unofficial‖ policy practices (Wortham et al. 2002). The extant literature 
on bilingual education is methodologically limited insofar as case studies do not permit a 
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systematic quantitative analysis of theoretical propositions, do not utilize control 
variables to ensure that research findings do not result from spurious relationships 
between explanatory variables, and are not necessarily generalizeable to a variety of 
policy jurisdictions. According to Meier and Stewart (1991), ―three qualities are 
necessary for a measure of public policy to be useful in linking minority representation to 
policy: 1) measures must represent policies that policymakers can influence; 2) the 
policies must be tied closely to minority interests so that policymakers can see the benefit 
of certain policies for their constituents; 3) the policies need to be measured over a wide 
variety of school districts so that the findings can be generalized‖ (13-14).  
Data 
My universe for analysis consists of 1,043 public school districts in Texas for the 
years 1995-2000. The large geographically dispersed Latino population in Texas makes 
this state particularly relevant for my analysis, given that I am interested in examining a 
subset of the Latino population, bilingual students. Furthermore, Texas is a large, 
heterogeneous state with diverse school districts (see Meier and O’Toole 2006), thus 
allowing for a wide range of demographic and geographic variation across school 
districts. We also know that the language minority student population in the state is 
comprised primarily of Spanish-speaking Latinos (Meier and O’Toole 2006). Therefore, 
Texas school districts permit the analysis to focus on examining theories of Latino 
descriptive representation. Finally, extensive school district-level data are available for 
Texas, including representation, budgeting, and bilingual education-specific and 
demographic measures.  
I utilize data from two primary sources: the Texas Education Agency (TEA) and 
the National Association of Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO). The TEA is 
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required to conduct an annual survey of all public school districts in Texas and collects 
data on student demographics, school district expenditures, and teacher composition and 
assignment. Specifically, TEA data include budgetary information on bilingual education 
programs, bilingual education teacher allotments, and bilingual education students. Data 
on Latino school board representation were obtained from annually published rosters of 
Latino elected officials collected by NALEO. 
Explaining Bilingual Education Implementation in School Districts 
 I aim to assess the effects of descriptive bureaucratic representation, among other 
things, on school districts’ commitment to comply with the Bilingual Education Act of 
1968. I conceptualize bilingual education policy implementation as a two-stage process in 
which 1) school districts make the decision to implement an ESL education program, and 
2) school districts make decisions regarding the level of resources to allocate toward ESL 
education when they implement a program. From a basic legal standpoint, I expect that 
school districts consider the 1968 Act—and its ESL student threshold—when evaluating 
the relative need for a bilingual education program. Moreover, I expect that descriptive 
representatives (i.e., Latino school board members and Latino teachers) serve a critical 
advocacy role in addressing the educational needs of the linguistic minority student 
population in Texas school districts.    
Modeling Bilingual Education Implementation: Stage One 
The extant literature on representative bureaucracy and Latino education almost 
uniformly has conceptualized the dependent variable in terms of Latino student 
performance outcomes. Studies typically operationalize their dependent variable as a 
measure of standardized test scores (see Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, Wrinkle, and 
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Polinard 1999; Meier, Polinard, and Wrinkle 2000; Ross et al. 2010). This study diverges 
from previous research in that I do not focus on student performance outcomes. Instead, I 
am interested in examining the factors that influence the policy implementation process 
itself. For language minority Latinos in Texas, the bilingual education policy arena is 
well suited to examine the influence of descriptive representation and school district 
contextual variables on commitment to comply with the Bilingual Education Act. The 
first stage of my conceptual model examines the factors that influence school districts’ 
decisions to implement a bilingual education program. The dependent variable ESL 
Implementation takes the value 1 if school districts are observed as implementing a 
bilingual education program and 0 otherwise.  
Explanatory Variables 
Given that the 1968 Bilingual Education Act mandates that school districts must 
provide ESL programs when there are 20 or more ESL students in any grade level, my 
primary explanatory variable in the first stage of bilingual education implementation is a 
measure that captures the size of the linguistic minority student population in each school 
district. The TEA reports the number of ESL students as a percentage of total student 
enrollment. I transformed this percentage measure into a variable that captures the 
average number of ESL Students per grade level.

 This transformation places the measure 
                                                        
 The Bilingual Education Act requires that school districts with 20 or more ESL students 
in any grade level provide bilingual education. Therefore, I divided the total number of 
ESL students in a school district by the total number of grade levels (the Texas public 
school system has 14 grade levels). The TEA data do not disaggregate the number of ESL 
students by grade level; therefore, this measure is somewhat less than ideal. Ultimately, 
the measure underestimates the number of ESL students in the lowest grades, as ESL 
students are most likely identified in the earliest grades in elementary school.  
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into the framework of the 1968 legislation by allowing the analysis to distinguish 
between the relative size of the ESL student population across school districts.  
As previously noted, state and local bilingual education policy is essentially free 
from formal federal influence (Meier and Stewart 1991). Thus, individual school boards 
are given flexible discretion in developing, or failing to develop, their individual bilingual 
education programs. At the most basic level, a manual examination of the data revealed 
that, for the most part, Texas school districts with an average of 20 or more bilingual 
students per grade level are technically in compliance with the Act. That is, school 
districts that typically cross the bilingual student threshold and fall directly under the 
mandate of the federal legislation report either allocating a portion of their instructional 
expenditures towards bilingual education programs, or allocating teachers to bilingual 
education positions, or both. Only the Abilene school district—in central west Texas—
technically was noncompliant for five out of the six years examined. Figure 1 depicts the 
average number of bilingual students per grade level across all Texas school districts for 
the years 1995-2000. Central tendencies indicate that the average school district has more 
than 20 ESL students per grade level. Moreover, the average school district complies 
with the federal legislation to some degree—at least with regard to bilingual expenditures 
and/or bilingual teacher allotments.  
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Figure 2.1: Average ESL Students Per Grade Level 
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Descriptive Representation  
Bilingual education programs are implemented via a formal and informal policy 
process. This analysis focuses on the role that local education bureaucrats play in 
affecting school district policy implementation decisions and budgetary allocations. Some 
have found that the policy preferences of the agents of implementation are a crucial factor 
in explaining policy-related compliance (Bali 2003). Because bilingual education 
programs are implemented under conditions where local policymakers have a high degree 
of discretion, and because bilingual education is a high salience issue for Latino teachers 
and parents, I argue that Latino school board members may be receptive to language 
minority interests. That is, at the school district level, descriptive representatives may be 
more receptive to the policy preferences of their local constituency, and descriptive 
representation may develop into substantive representation.  
To test for the influence of descriptive representation, I include a variable that 
accounts for Latino Descriptive Representation on school boards. This variable is 
operatonalized as the percentage of Latinos serving on school boards as a total of all 
school board members in a district. Moreover, teachers who serve as the street-level 
bureaucrats at the ―front lines‖ of the education policy implementation process may play 
an important role in recognizing ESL students and the need for a stronger commitment to 
bilingual education in a given school district (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Hess 
and Leal 1997). Thus, I employ a second measure of bureaucratic descriptive 
representation, Latino Teacher Representation, operationalized as the percentage of 
Latino teachers in a school district as a total of all teachers in a given district. I expect 
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that increased numbers of Latino school board members and Latino teachers will 
positively influence bilingual education implementation: 
Primary Hypothesis (Stage 1): School districts with a higher average of ESL 
students per grade level and with higher levels of Latino representation on 
school boards and among teachers are more likely to implement bilingual 
education programs. 
 
I also include a variable that controls for Average Teacher Experience (in years) to 
account for the possibility that experienced minority teachers may be more adept at 
recognizing an increased need for bilingual education implementation.   
 My model accounts for the composition of the linguistic minority population and 
the Latino composition on Texas school boards. I expect that as the linguistic minority 
(i.e., Spanish-speaking) student population increases, commitment to bilingual education 
implementation should increase. Furthermore, my conceptual model hypothesizes a 
possible interaction between Latino school board representation and the average number 
of ESL students per grade level. That is, the relative size of the linguistic minority 
population may serve as a moderating factor that influences the effect of Latino 
descriptive representation on bilingual education implementation. Latino school board 
members may be reacting to their perceptions of the policy preferences of the larger 
Latino population in a given school district—and may advocate ESL education 
implementation as a factor in their calculus for getting reelected. On the other hand, in 
school districts where there is a highly visible language minority student population, we 
may assume that bilingual education implementation is almost guaranteed. Therefore, 
descriptive representation may ultimately matter most where English is least common 
among the Latino student population. Thus, I account for the potential interactive effects 
of Latino Descriptive Representation * ESL Students.  
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Modeling Bilingual Education Implementation Effort: Stage Two   
The second stage of my model of bilingual education implementation examines 
the factors that influence school districts’ commitment to bilingual education. I model 
commitment to implementation in terms of ESL education resource allocations. 
Specifically, school districts in Texas are required to report their yearly allocation of 
bilingual expenditures as a percentage of total instructional expenditures. School districts 
also report the number of full-time equivalent bilingual education teaching positions that 
they allot as a percentage of total full-time equivalent teaching positions. I utilize both of 
these measures as alternative dependent variables because some school districts report 
allocating no bilingual education expenditures while reporting bilingual education teacher 
allocations, and vice versa.  
The TEA data report bilingual expenditure data as a percentage of total 
instructional expenditures. I transformed the percentage measure into actual bilingual 
education expenditure amounts. Similarly TEA reports bilingual education teacher 
allotments as a percentage of total teachers in a given school district. These 
transformations allow me to compare the disaggregated numbers of ESL subpopulations 
in a school district—measures based on absolute numbers—with bilingual education 
budgetary allotments in absolute numbers (Robinson 2002). In order to compare ESL 
education resource allocations across Texas school districts, I will include total 
instructional expenditures and the total number of full-time equivalent teaching positions 
(the denominators in these transformed percentage measures) as control variables in the 
analysis that follows. Thus, my dependent variables measure ESL Expenditure Effort and 
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ESL Teacher Allotment Effort. As such, other things equal, higher values of these 
variables indicate higher levels of school district commitment to bilingual education.  
Explanatory Variables 
The second stage of my conceptual model takes into account representational and 
school district contextual factors that may influence the bilingual education 
implementation process. Thus, I selectively utilize variables from the first stage of the 
model but now examine how these variables affect bilingual education resource 
allocation levels. Other studies have examined bilingual policy implementation as a one-
stage process of resource allocations (see Robinson 2002). I have theoretical reasons for 
modeling bilingual education implementation as a two-stage process. Conceptually, I 
seek to distinguish between the conditions that influence whether a school district 
implements a bilingual education program and the factors that explain the level of 
resources are willing to allocate toward ESL education once a program is established. 
Thus, because school districts that have implemented an ESL program constitute a 
censored sample, failure to account for the two-stage nature of this policy implementation 
process may threaten any inferential leverage obtained from the empirical findings. 
Despite the presence of Latino school board members and/or teachers in a given school 
district, said district would have little reason to implement a bilingual education program 
if there are no ESL students who would utilize the program if implemented.  
Consistent with the first stage of the model, I expect that the average number of 
ESL Students per grade level will have a positive effect on bilingual education 
expenditures and teacher allocations, other things being equal. That is, as the number of 
ESL students increases, we may expect school districts to pump more resources into their 
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ESL programs—if we can assume those resources are available. I also include the Latino 
Descriptive Representation variable from the first stage of my model into the second 
stage. There is reason to suppose that Latino school board members may be instrumental 
in ESL education resource allocation decisions in addition to influencing whether 
bilingual education is implemented in a given school district.  
School District Context  
In addition to the potential influence of descriptive representation, a variety of 
school district level contextual variables may influence bilingual education budgetary 
allocations—and policymakers’ decisions on school board budget and/or teacher 
allocations. Individual school districts undoubtedly vary in their potential resource 
constraints. Therefore, I include a variable that accounts for school district Wealth as 
measure of total school district revenues. I control for school district Size with a variable 
that measures total student enrollment. I expect that larger school districts are more likely 
to be ethnically diverse and be comprised of higher levels ESL students when compared 
with smaller school districts. However, larger school districts may face higher levels of 
resource constraints and be less financially capable of adequately addressing the needs of 
linguistic minority students. Finally, I include measures that control for Total 
Instructional Expenditures in my bilingual expenditure model and Total Teachers in my 
ESL teacher allotment model. These variables allow the analysis to take school districts’ 
relative resource allocations and/or constraints into account. My conceptual model 
hypothesizes a positive link between school district wealth, school district size, and per 
pupil instructional spending on bilingual education budgetary allocations.  
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My model also accounts for the economic demographics of the student 
population. The variable that captures the percentage of Low-Income Students

 in a 
school district was not transformed into an absolute number of the total number of low-
income students, simply because it is a contextual measure of the school district as a 
whole—and not a language minority population that may or may not require bilingual 
education (see Robinson 2002). Given that Latinos are disproportionately poor, I expect 
that higher levels of low-income students in a school district will negatively influence 
bilingual education budgetary allocations—as poor Latino populations have less political 
clout and influence over their local representatives. Furthermore, non-linguistic minority 
low-income students arguably have greater educational needs than their wealthier 
counterparts—potentially placing additional constraints on ESL education spending.  
Primary Hypothesis (Stage 2): School districts with a higher average of ESL 
students per grade level and with higher levels of Latino representation on 
school boards and are more likely to demonstrate increased effort toward 
allocating resources toward bilingual education programs, other things being 
equal. 
 
A table of descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables can be found 
in the Appendix. 
Estimation Technique 
 I conceptualize bilingual education implementation as a two-stage process and 
specifically employ the Heckman two-stage statistical estimation procedure (see 
Heckman 1979). The first stage estimates a model that predicts the presence of bilingual 
education programs for school districts in Texas. Summary statistics reveal that around 
                                                        
 The low-income variable is derived from a measure that captures the percentage of 
students who are eligible for free or reduced price lunches in a school district. 
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48.6% of the sample of Texas school districts have implemented a bilingual education 
program by allocating instructional expenditures toward ESL education, and 54.6% of 
school districts have implemented ESL education by hiring ESL teachers. Thus, bilingual 
education implementation may be a nonrandom event (see Heckman 1979) for the sample 
of Texas school districts if there are variables that distinctively influence: 1) whether a 
school district chooses to implement a bilingual education program, and 2) the level of 
instructional expenditure and/or teacher allocation resources. That is, if selectivity exists 
in this sample, the coefficients from a standard OLS regression may not be applicable to 
all school districts in Texas—both those with and without a bilingual education program.  
Modeling the factors that influence resource allocations alone, without taking into 
account that some school districts will not require bilingual education in the first place, 
could lead to biased estimation results and erroneous inferential conclusions. That is, my 
conceptual model posits that a sample that consists of only school districts that choose 
implement bilingual education programs may differ considerably in certain unmeasured 
ways from school districts that do not implement ESL education. According to King, 
Keohane, and Verba (1994), ―In these cases, something can be said about the causes of 
the dependent variable; but the inferences are likely to be biased, if the explanatory 
variables do not take into account the selection rule, any selection rule correlated with 
the dependent variable attenuates estimates of causal effects on average‖ (130).  For 
these reasons, the first stage of my models analyzes all Texas school districts, those with 
and without bilingual education programs, and attempts to correct for this nonrandomly 
selected event in the second stage by examining only those school districts that have 
implemented ESL education programs. Thus, my study constitutes an attempt to 
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disentangle the factors that explain of the existence or nonexistence of a bilingual 
education program from the factors that explain the actual amount of resources allocated 
towards these programs. My conceptual model treats school districts that have not 
implemented a bilingual education program as missing on the dependent variable and the 
Heckman statistical procedure estimates a two-stage model that controls for the 
likelihood that school districts have engaged in ESL education implementation. The 
specific formula for the statistical estimation is as follows:  
Stage 1:               z*i  = wiγ + ui  
                               zi = 1 if z* i > 0  
                               zi = 0 if z* i ≤ 0 
 
 
Stage 2:               yi = βxi + εi             if   z*i > 0 
                              yi = unobserved  if   z* i ≤ 0 
 
Assumptions:    ui  ~ N (0, 1) 
                           εi ~  N (0, σ
2
) 
                         corr  (ui,, εi) = ρ 
 
 
where Stage 1 represents the selection equation and Stage 2 represents the outcome 
equation. The Heckman procedure essentially estimates two separate regressions: a probit 
model for the first stage of the analysis and an OLS regression for the second stage of 
analysis. The probit and OLS results are run simultaneously in the Heckman procedure to 
account for the fact that the results for both stages of the model are correlated with each 
other. The Heckman model assumes a bivariate normal distribution with means of zero 
and correlation ρ (Heckman 1979). 
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Chapter Three – Findings  
 The empirical results for the models of bilingual education implementation are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 includes results for a two-stage estimation of 1) the 
factors that influence bilingual education program implementation, and 2) the factors that 
influence bilingual education expenditure level effort. Table 2 includes results for a two-
stage estimation of 1) the factors that influence bilingual education program 
implementation, and 2) the factors that influence bilingual education teacher allotment 
effort.  
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Table 3.1: Explaining Bilingual Education Implementation & Expenditures, 1995-2000 
 
Heckman Two-Stage Procedure Coefficient Std. Error Z P>|z| 
Stage 1: ESL Implementation     
ESL Students 0.014 0.001 16.42 0.000 
Latino Descriptive Representation  0.001 0.002 5.20 0.000 
Latino Teacher Representation 0.001 0.002 4.60 0.000 
Teacher Experience 0.018 0.007 2.52 0.012 
Latino Descriptive Representation * ESL 
Students -0.000 0.000 -4.96 0.000 
Constant -0.471 0.087 -5.41 0.000 
     
Stage 2: ESL Expenditure Effort     
ESL Students 5401.114 587.922 9.19 0.000 
Latino Descriptive Representation  17914.98 3096.353 5.79 0.000 
Low-Income  14321.89 2752.187 5.20 0.000 
Size -75.252 34.333 -2.19 0.028 
Wealth -10.882 58.19 -0.19 0.852 
Total Instructional Expenditures 0.088 0.012 7.58 0.000 
Latino Descriptive Representation * ESL 
Students -95.285 9.077 -10.50 0.000 
Constant -2990662.0 350967.8 -8.52 0.000 
 
     Stage 1 dependent variable: ESL Implementation 
     Stage 2 dependent variable: ESL Expenditures 
     Mean of dependent variable = $764,099.60 
     Number of observations = 6210; Censored = 3096, Uncensored = 3114 
     Wald test of independent equations:  (7) = 3965.12; Prob >  = 0.000  
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Table 3.2: Explaining Bilingual Education Implementation & Teacher Allotments, 1995-
2000 
 
Heckman Two-Stage Procedure Coefficient Std. Error Z P>|z| 
Stage 1: ESL Implementation     
ESL Students 0.094 0.003 31.97 0.000 
Latino Descriptive Representation  0.012 0.002 6.85 0.000 
Latino Teacher Representation 0.001 0.002 0.39 0.694 
Teacher Experience 0.018 0.008 2.44 0.015 
Latino Descriptive Representation * ESL 
Students 
-0.001 0.000 -12.91 0.000 
Constant -0.539 0.09 -6.00 0.000 
     
Stage 2: ESL Teacher Allotment Effort     
ESL Students 0.388 0.008 48.67 0.000 
Latino Descriptive Representation  -0.041 0.037 -1.13 0.258 
Low-Income  0.308 0.039 7.92 0.000 
Size 0.005 0.001 6.61 0.000 
Wealth -0.000 0.001 -0.02 0.985 
Total Teachers -0.052 0.012 -4.18 0.000 
Latino Descriptive Representation * ESL 
Students 
0.001 0.000 11.42 0.000 
Constant -26.574 3.379 -7.87 0.000 
 
     Stage 1 dependent variable: ESL Implementation 
     Stage 2 dependent variable: ESL Teacher Allotments 
     Mean of dependent variable = 28.86 
     Number of observations = 6210; Censored = 2699, Uncensored = 3511 
     Wald test of independent equations:  (7) = 34269.75; Prob >  = 0.000 
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Stage One: Bilingual Education Implementation 
As both tables illustrate, the process that dictates whether school districts in Texas 
make the decision to implement bilingual education (Stage 1) generally comports with 
my primary hypotheses. School districts are predictably responsive to the presence of 
ESL students who may benefit from ESL education—especially in response to the 
average number of ESL students per grade level. Table 1 reveals that the presence of 
Latino school board members and Latino teachers positively, and statistically 
significantly, influences ESL education implementation in the teacher allocation model. 
Thus, the raw results indicate that Latino school board members and Latino teachers 
appear to be serving as advocates for linguistic minority students.  
Table 2 shows that the presence of Latino school board members significantly 
improves the prospects for ESL education implementation, but the presence of Latino 
teachers does not significantly influence whether school districts implement bilingual 
education. This finding is understandable, given that school board members generally 
have considerable influence over teacher allotments. Latino teachers may play an 
instrumental role in making recommendations about the need for ESL education and 
bringing it to school board members’ attention. Under this logic, Latino teachers may pay 
an indirect role in influencing whether school board members decide to implement 
bilingual education. However, teachers generally do not have a meaningful amount of 
control over how school boards decide to allocate the ―types‖ of teaching positions 
available in a given school district.  
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Teacher experience is statistically significant in both models, indicating that more 
experienced teachers may be more adept at recognizing ESL students and speaking out 
on these students’ behalf. At first glance of the data, the results for the interaction terms 
in both models demonstrate a deviation from what was expected. Tables 1 and 2 indicate 
that the interaction between Latino school board representation and the average number 
of ESL students per grade is statistically significant in a negative direction, contrary to 
what was hypothesized. This divergence could be explained by the notion that linguistic 
minorities may be perceived as wielding limited social capital. Latino school board 
members may not consider the larger linguistic minority population a threat to their 
reelection prospects. If students are characterized as ―limited English proficiency‖, then 
we may assume that they come from homes where English is not the primary spoken 
language. Furthermore, if Spanish-speaking Latinos are marginalized among societal 
structures, the presence or absence of descriptive representatives may influence the extent 
to which Spanish-speaking Latino parents are willing to interact with or confront school 
authorities and/or administrators. This realization would raise the question of whether 
Latino school board members are genuinely engaged in substantive representation of 
their Latino linguistic minority constituents.  
Finally, the significant chi-squared result for the Wald test of independent 
equations in the estimation of both models provides empirical support for my conceptual 
model. That is, failing to take into account the two-stage process that determines 
bilingual education implementation biased results and potentially erroneous statistical 
inferences. There are systematic and nonrandom differences between school districts that 
implement ESL education and those that do not. Specifically, all school districts in Texas 
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do not meet the ESL student threshold requirements mandated by the Bilingual Education 
Act of 1968. By modeling this policy process as a two-stage procedure, I control for this 
selection bias.  
 Raw coefficients, however, tell only part of the story. Therefore, I utilized 
CLARIFY (see King, Tomz, and Wittenburg 2000) to generate predictions to illustrate 
the substantive impact that my explanatory variables have on bilingual education policy 
implementation. These predictions were derived from 1,000 simulations based on the 
probit covariances in the first stage of my models. Table 3 presents the results of the 
probit analysis. It is not surprising that the results, for the most part, are virtually 
indistinguishable from the Stage 1 results in Tables 1 and 2. Next, I estimate the 
predicted impact of a series of ―hypothetical‖ school districts at key explanatory variable 
values. 
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Table 3.3: Explaining Bilingual Education Implementation, 1995-2000 
 
Probit 
Model 3A 
Expenditure 
Model 
Model 3B 
ESL Teacher 
Model 
   
ESL Students 
 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.094*** 
(0.003) 
Latino Descriptive Representation  
 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Latino Teacher Representation 
 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Teacher Experience 
 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
Latino Descriptive Representation * ESL Students 
 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 
 
-0.471*** 
(0.087) 
-0.539*** 
(0.09) 
   
Observations 6210 6210 
Pseudo-R2 0.107 0.229 
 
      Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1 
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 In order to generate implications for the probit stage of my empirical models, I 
estimate the impact of specific explanatory variable values on the predicted probabilities 
of bilingual education implementation. For instance, if all of the explanatory variables in 
Model 3A (see Appendix for descriptive statistics) are held at their means; that is, where 
the average number of ESL students per grade level is approximately 30 students, Latinos 
comprise about 8.2% of school board members and 8.76% of teachers, and average 
teacher experience is 11.4 years, the likelihood that a school district will implement ESL 
education program by allocating ESL expenditures is approximately 59.4%. 
Contrastingly, the likelihood that school districts will implement ESL education by hiring 
ESL teachers is 98.2%. Taking the 1968 Act into account, this means that likelihood 
estimates would characterize school districts as technically non-compliant about 40% of 
the time if one were operationalizinng the dependent variable in terms of ESL 
expenditures. These findings may serve as an example of the importance of considering 
alternative measurements of variables of interest in specifying empirical models. In this 
case, we might infer that school districts employ divergent methods in classifying 
bilingual education resource allocations. When the ESL student threshold is set at the 
legally-mandated threshold of 20 ESL students—and all other explanatory variables are 
held at their means—the likelihood that a school district will implement bilingual 
education drops to 53.1% for Model 3A and 85.3% for Model 3B. Ultimately, these 
inconsistencies across models underscore the limitations of reporting simple coefficient 
significance tests.  
 When there are an average 20 ESL students per grade level, and Latino school 
board members and Latino teachers are held at their maximum (100%) values for the 
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sample of Texas schools (other variables held at their means), the likelihood that school 
districts will implement bilingual education skyrockets to 94.5% for Model 3A and 
98.8% for Model 3B. Contrastingly, when the ESL students variable is held at 20 and the 
Latino school board and teacher representation variables are held at their minimum 
values (0%), with all other explanatory variables at their means, the bilingual education 
implementation likelihood value drops to 47.7% for Model 3A and 82.6% for Model 3B. 
For the ESL expenditure model, this constitutes a nearly 50% drop from full descriptive 
representation. These findings hold substantively important implications for my 
hypotheses on the effects of Latino descriptive representation on bilingual education 
budgetary allocations. It appears that even when school districts barely fall under the 
legal parameters of the 1968 legislation, Latino descriptive representation plays a 
consequential role in the ESL education policy process when money is involved. The 
second stage analyses (see below) may shed some light on the effect of the explanatory 
variables on relative resource allocations.   
 Finally, ESL education implementation predictions when Latino school board and 
teacher representation is set at 50% hovers around 75% for Model 3A and 94% for Model 
3B, when school districts meet the 20 student threshold. Similarly, a school district with 
either 100% Latino school board members or 100% Latino teachers, other things equal, is 
about 75% likely to implement bilingual education for Model 3A and 99% for Model 3B. 
Thus, whether we are characterizing Latino school board members and/or Latino teachers 
as potential descriptive representatives, it appears that linguistic minority students are 
categorically and demonstrably represented by their coethnics. 
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Stage Two: Bilingual Education Resource Allocations 
Implementation as Expenditure Effort 
Turning to the second stage of my models, we can examine the factors that 
influence the level of resources school districts are willing to allocate toward bilingual 
education. Looking at the second-stage results in Table 1, we see that increased levels of 
ESL students per grade level and Latino school board representation positively 
statistically influence bilingual education expenditure amounts. The significance of ESL 
Students suggests, for example, that as the average number of ESL students per grade 
level increases by one unit, the average school district increases its bilingual education 
expenditures by about $5,401.11.  
Results for the Latino Descriptive Representation variable indicate that as Latino 
school board representation increases by 1%, the average Texas school district increases 
bilingual education expenditures by $17,914.98. As in the first stage of the model, the 
interaction term between Latino school board representation and average ESL students is 
statistically significant in a negative direction. As stated previously, this finding may be 
reflecting school board members’ perceptions of the larger linguistic minority population 
as electorally non-threatening.  
Overall, it appears that the average Texas school district is financially responsive 
to the linguistic minority student population, and Latino school board members may play 
an instrumental role as political advocates for these students. Contextual and 
demographic school district characteristics also significantly influence bilingual 
education expenditures. For instance, a 1% increase in the proportion of low-income 
students in a school district positively increases bilingual education expenditures by 
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about $14,321.89. This finding is interesting for several reasons. First, one might assume 
that ESL students—or ethnic minority students for that matter— are more likely to come 
from low-income homes. Given this assumption, one might posit that ESL students 
would be among those with the lowest levels of socio-political capital to influence the 
local education policy. However, if we assume that linguistic minority students generally 
will fall into the low-income category, we might expect that—to a certain extent—
increased levels of ESL students coincide with increased levels of low-income students. 
Thus, the results for the Low-Income variable would not be entirely surprising.  
School district size, as measured by total student enrollment, has a negative 
statistically significant influence on bilingual education expenditures. As student 
enrollment numbers increase, school districts are faced with additional resource 
constraints. Some assert that providing bilingual education opportunities to ESL students 
is ―limited by the structural nature of the American school system‖ (Meier and Stewart 
1991, 70). School districts typically must raise a significant portion of their funding by 
relying on property taxes—with local school district funding varying significantly among 
districts within a given state (ibid). The U.S. Latino population, as a group, is appreciably 
affected by the variation in school district funding, as a considerable segment of the 
population resides in primarily urban poor areas with limited—and declining—tax bases 
(ibid). Furthermore, if additional student enrollments generally do not include limited 
English proficiency students, then school districts would not necessarily be expected to 
increase their ESL education expenditures. Finally, my control for total instructional 
expenditures is positively statistically significant, indicating that the aforementioned 
results are applicable even when controlling for the reality that school districts operate 
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under different instructional education expenditure constraints. School districts with more 
overall instructional expenditures are inherently more capable of allocating increased 
levels of instructional expenditures to the various expenditure categories. 
Implementation as Teacher Allocation Effort 
Table 2 presents results for bilingual education resource allocations in terms of 
ESL teacher allotments. Consistent with the ESL expenditure model, the second-stage 
results indicate that as the average number of ESL students per grade level increases, the 
number of teaching positions allocated towards bilingual education increases. However, 
unlike the bilingual expenditures model, the Latino descriptive representation variable is 
not statistically significant. It appears that the presence of Latino school board members 
does not have a substantively meaningful effect on how many ESL teachers are hired. 
These findings are consistent with previous analyses (see Robinson 2002) that do not find 
a statistically significant relationship between Latino school board representation and 
ESL teacher allocations. Of course, Robinson’s (2002) findings may be an artifact of 
model specification and the one-stage nature of his analysis. Furthermore, his analysis did 
not examine bilingual education implementation in terms of ESL expenditures.  
Interestingly, the interaction term between Latino school board representation and 
average ESL students is statistically significant in a positive direction in the ESL teacher 
allotment model. It could be the case that school board members operating under 
budgetary constraints are indeed recognizing the need for ESL education. In times where 
budgets do not appear friendly toward bilingual education, Latino school board members 
turn to their power over to determining how many bilingual education teacher positions 
to allocate for a school year. In this vein, the interaction term does reveal a level of 
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Latino school board member responsiveness and may constitute an example of 
substantive representation. Latino school board members may, in fact, play a strategic 
role in assuring that ESL students’ educational needs are being met, specifically in the 
classroom.  
Just as in the bilingual expenditure model, the low-income variable has a 
positively statistically significant relationship with ESL teacher allocations. Higher low-
income student populations may be located in urban or extreme rural areas. Linguistic 
minority Latino students may be disproportionately poor. Ultimately, the analysis 
indicates that despite potential resource constraints that come with the realities of 
predominantly low-income student populations, school districts are generally responsive 
to the educational needs of linguistic minority students.  
School district size, as measured by total student enrollment, has a positive and 
statistically significant influence on ESL teacher allocations. As student enrollment 
numbers increase, it appears that school districts may be responding to the unique 
teaching needs that linguistic minority students may require—especially if school 
districts traditionally have not encountered a substantial number of ESL students in the 
past. Finally, my control for total full-time equivalent teaching positions is statistically 
significant in the negative direction, indicating that as the total number of teachers in a 
school district increases, the total number of ESL teacher allotments decreases. This 
finding makes logical sense. Bilingual education teachers do not typically comprise a 
substantial proportion of total teaching positions in a Texas school district. They are hired 
to address the specific needs of a subset of students. Barring any major changes in the 
linguistic demographic characteristics of the student population, the relative number of 
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ESL teachers would not necessarily increase linearly in proportion to total teacher 
increases—assuming that students’ bilingual education needs have been met.   
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Chapter Four – Conclusion  
Limitations, Implications and Future Research 
 I have argued that in order to explain and understand the bilingual education 
policy implementation process, researchers must examine the interdependent relationship 
between bilingual education implementation and bilingual education resource allocation. 
School districts must first decide whether to implement a bilingual education program, 
and then decide how to allocate resources toward ESL education once a program is 
implemented. The Heckman two-stage estimation procedure provides a noteworthy 
improvement over past model specifications that have relied on OLS regression alone. 
Generally, the empirical results indicate that Latino descriptive representatives (i.e., 
school board members and teachers) serve as advocates for linguistic minority students 
by wielding their administrative authority over the bilingual education resource allocation 
process. Perhaps most encouragingly, the results indicate that school districts in Texas 
are, for the most part, attempting to address the educational needs of linguistic minority 
students.  
My analysis contributes to the literature by providing a systematic empirical 
examination of the factors that determine bilingual education policy implementation in a 
diverse, heterogeneous setting. Specifically, theoretical and conceptual models attempt to 
delineate direct policy linkages between politics, bureaucracy, and minority 
representation. The preceding study moves beyond descriptive representation as it relates 
to the extant literature’s ambiguous findings regarding feelings of political trust, 
empowerment, and efficacy. When linguistic minority students introduce a potential 
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problem with the educational system, researchers are well-positioned have to assess 
whether descriptive representation, in fact, leads to substantive representation.      
Future Research and the ―New Latino Diaspora‖ 
Throughout the 1990s, large segments of the Latino population—immigrant and 
non-immigrants—began settling ―outside the major urban centers and agricultural 
corridors they had previously occupied‖ (Wortham et al. 2002, viii). A growing Latino 
presence has been exhibited in cities and counties throughout the American northeast, 
southeast, Midwest, and mountain west including states such as: North Carolina, Maine, 
Georgia, Indiana, Arkansas, rural Illinois, and Colorado (Hamann et al. 2002). Murrillo 
and Villenas (1997) assert that these Latino migrations constitute a fundamental 
demographic shift that has led to the development of a ―New Latino Diaspora.‖ As Latino 
families are expanding into geographic areas that have not been traditionally inhabited by 
Latinos—and because a large segment of the Latino population is comprised of recent 
immigrants—the ways in which educational policy actors respond to, accommodate, or 
disregard ESL students yield substantial implications for whether public schools ―best 
meet the educational needs of new Latino immigrants‖ (Wortham et al. 2002, ix). In 
California, the percentage of ESL students ―has risen 12% since 1994 and 300% since 
1980; in California, 79% of ESL students are Spanish-speaking; they represent 25% of 
the total public school population‖ (Martinez Aleman 2006, 28). In New York, 14% of 
the total public school population is comprised of Latino ESL students (New York State 
Education Department, Office of Bilingual Education, 2004). Forty percent of Latino 
students in the U.S. are identified as ―English language proficient,‖ and Ginorino and 
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Huston (2001) note that the percentage of limited English proficient (LEP) Latino 
students may be even higher in geographic areas where Latino students are newly arrived. 
The academic debate over language minority instructional models (e.g., bilingual 
education versus sink-or-swim English submersion) ―has tended to focus almost 
exclusively on areas with large, long-established populations of immigrant and non-
English speaking families‖ in states such as: California, Texas, Arizona, Colorado, 
Florida, New York, and Illinois (Beck and Allexsaht-Snider 2002, 38). Furthermore, very 
little is known about the overlap and dissimilarities in the formulation and 
implementation of bilingual education policy in the comparative sense in the New Latino 
Diaspora (Hamann et al. 2002). My analysis is limited in that it does not benefit from the 
merits of a comparative state analysis.  
The bilingual education policy process—and language policy more generally—
are well suited to provide a plethora of political research questions and analyses. For 
instance, in the political behavior arena, local media outlets and national media 
representations of the Latino population influx into new incidence areas have spawned 
numerous English language initiatives. According to the Intercultural Development 
Research Association, 19 U.S. states had ―official English‖ laws in effect as of 1996—of 
these 19 states, 11 were located in the South. Given that English language political 
debates find fertile ground in American politics, responses may then translate into 
educational policy backlash. Politically charged initiatives undoubtedly influence the 
policy process.  
California’s 1998 ―Education for Children‖ Proposition 227 initiative and 
Arizona’s Proposition 203 initiative attempted to dismantle bilingual instruction across 
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these respective states (Beck and Allexsaht-Snider 2002). Baquedano-Lopez (2004) 
argues that after the ballot initiative was ruled unconstitutional, an increased emphasis on 
English-only instruction in California served as an alternate way of marginalizing 
Spanish-speakers, as ―Spanish-speakers were constructed as having a set of traditions that 
differ from the norm‖ (221). Beginning in 1994, Georgia’s State Superintendent of 
Schools, Linda Schrenko, led an educational bureaucracy ―seemingly hostile or, at best, 
facile understanding of the challenges and needs of immigrant, language minority, and 
Hispanic students.‖ Schrenko publicly announced her support for ―Official English‖ 
policies on her 1998 reelection website, and appointed bureaucrats who expressed 
congruent language education ideology to fill Georgia Department of Education 
administrative vacancies (Hamann 1997; Beck and Allexsaht-Snider 2002).  By 
constructing a problematic identity for Spanish-speaking Latinos, Americanization 
programs that target ethnic and linguistic minorities may be legitimized as policy that 
accords with mainstream American norms (Baquedano-Lopez 2004; Crawford 1992).  
According to Bali (2003), policy preferences of the agents of implementation are 
a crucial factor in explaining policy-related compliance. Popular ballot initiatives—
including California’s Proposition 227 and Arizona’s Proposition 203—have mandated 
reductions or eliminations of bilingual education programs in public schools. While 
federal law still mandates that bilingual education be provided in schools with 20 or more 
ESL students per any one grade level, bilingual education and/or English-only initiatives 
may, in fact, significantly influence whether individual school districts comply with 
federal law.  
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Future research must consider the unique contextual environment that immigrant 
Latino families inhabit. Do descriptive education policy actors serve as a mechanism for 
parental engagement in the bilingual education policy process? Trueba (2004) finds that 
despite Spanish-speaking immigrant parents’ structural (i.e., language) barriers to policy 
engagement, many immigrant parents do successfully engage in the education policy 
process. That is, some parents overcome the odds and ―manage to have stronger, more 
powerful, and more successful school engagement experiences than others‖ (Perez 
Carreon 2005, 471). Therefore, we may inquire as to what forces may influence informal 
parental involvement in the bilingual education policy process.  Furthermore, what kinds 
of bilingual education policies do actively engaged Latino parents advocate? Previous 
findings indicate that foreign-born Latinos with low levels of acculturation are more 
supportive of public policies that provide benefits to immigrants (including bilingual 
education) than their native-born, highly acculturated counterparts (Miller, Polinard, and 
Wrinkle 1984; Polinard, Miller, and de la Garza 1984).  Before scholars can begin asking 
what constitutes ―good‖ policy with regard to the education of linguistically diverse 
students, we should continue to examine whether policy actors/policy environments are 
predisposed to implement—or fail to implement—policies that attempt to accommodate 
these students.  
 
 
 
 
   43 
        Appendix 
Descriptive Statistics: Explanatory and Dependent Variables 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
      
ESL Students 6,494 29.93 172.72 0.0 3668.05 
Latino Descriptive 
Representation 
6,210 8.203 19.35 0.0 100 
Latino Teacher 
Representation 
6,494 36.28 164.57 0.0 2164.6 
Teacher Experience (in 
years) 
6,493 11.40 2.68 0.0 20 
Total ESL Teachers 6,494 15.76 94.02 0.0 2211.22 
Latino Descriptive 
Representation * ESL 
Students 
6,210 726.38 5209.92 0.0 120786 
% Low Income Students 6,494 46.56 19.91 0.0 100 
Size 6,494 3552.25 11018.68 3 210988 
Wealth 6,493 1.99e+07 6.17e+07 14.0 1.35e+09 
ESL Students/Grade Level 6,494 29.93 172.72 0.0 3668.05 
Instructional Expenditures 
Per Student (in dollars) 
6,491 3,283.08 1,118.7 0.0 35,839 
ESL Implementation 
(Expenditures) 
6,494 0.4861 0.4998 0 1 
ESL Expenditures 6,489 371,746.4 2,911,152 0.0 1.05e+08 
ESL Implementation 
(Teachers) 
6,494 0.546 0.4979 0 1 
Total ESL Teachers 6,494 15.76 94.02 0.0 2211.22 
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